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The PhD thesis of Olena Senyuta consists of three chapters that will be dealt with in order. 
 
Chapter 1, co-authored with Kresimir Zigic, is entitled “Managing Spillovers: an Endogenous Sunk 
Cost Approach”. It has appeared as joint paper #472 in the Working Paper Series of CERGE-EI. 
The chapter builds on work of John Sutton (1991, 2001) who presents an “Endogenous Sunk Cost 
model” to provide answers to regulatory questions such as: “What are the important determinants 
for the level of concentration of a particular industry?”. Here the classical models of Bertrand and 
Cournot competition produce only very stark results. Whereas Sutton (1991) focuses on investments 
in advertising (and perceived quality) to cause such sunk costs, Sutton (2001) extends the focus to 
learning by doing and network effects (and thus objective quality). Here spillover externalities can 
change the predictions of the original model as investigated in my own paper, Behringer (2014). 
A similar idea motivates the present chapter. The model allows for a direct (R&D) investment in 
quality that may, via spillovers, also benefit the quality of other firms, e.g by reverse-engineering. A 
difference to my paper is that there the quality parameter is determined indirectly by the choice of 
output (learning by doing) whereas here it is determined directly at some given linear cost. 
Two model variants are presented that investigate the cases where (the prevention of) spillovers are 
exogenous and then endogenous choices for the firms. If firms can (partly) protect themselves from 
such spillovers (e.g. by secrecy, patents, or copyrights) the remaining spillovers are termed “ex-post 
spillovers”.  
In the first variant, too large a degree of exogenous spillovers can lead to the non-existence of a 
lower-bound to market concentration, i.e. as an industry gets large, it may become incrementally 
fragmented. Here I think that the common motivation with Behringer (2014) deserves to be specified 
a little more carefully than is done on p.7. 
In the second variant firms may protect from such spillovers. In this extension the firms face an 
additional stage following the quality choice stage where they may decrease all spillovers discretely 
to zero (hence spillovers cannot be continuously reduced) again at some given linear cost. The 
possibility of protection may then re-establish the existence of a lower bound to concentration in line 
with the original endogenous sunk cost model that does not allow for spillovers. 
 
 
Due to this timing of the model in section 1.4, the “all-protection equilibrium” quality is a function of 
the cost of protection alpha but no longer of the spillover parameter theta that is reduced to zero 
and the “no-protection equilibrium” quality is a function of the theta only. This translates into 
deviation conditions at the protection stage that are plotted for a parametric example in Figure 1.4. 
for two choices of alpha. 
This plot reveals parameter regions for protection and non-protection equilibria. I am aware that the 
underlying calculations involver an implicit form of N(delta) from the zero-profit conditions (1.8 and 
1.11) but it would be interesting to see this in a 3d plot for continuous alpha and check whether any 
interesting comparative statics can be detected.  
Also for the regions where one has a co-existence (or non-existence) of the two regimes it would be 
interesting to take into account the neglected integer constraint on N and see if these regions are 
meaningful. 
The symmetry assumptions made in this optimal deviation setting as well as the inability to 
continuously reduce spillovers (leading to discontinuous jumps in other key endogenous variable of 
the model) are quite stark when looked at for applied purposes. Also the strict stage-game logic of 
this now 4-stage game and its implied timing are demanding in this respect. Some more discussion in 
the text of how such a setting may be alternatively investigated in a dynamic context (there is some 
in the footnotes) would be good.  
It would also be helpful for the reader if this chapter was more rigid w.r.t. the standard proposition-
proof structure of academic articles. It is often hard to see where propositions/lemmata are formally 
established (this should be done in addition to, but separate from the intuitive discussion in the text 
that could then contain less formalism) and, on the other hand, where the proofs in the Appendix 
relate to in the text. This should be easily feasible. 
Also I would suggest numbering and emphasizing the empirical hypotheses that appear at various 
points in the text of Chapter 1 more clearly, in particular where they emanate from the model. This 











Chapter 2 is entitled “Endogenous Sunk Costs, Spillovers and R&D incentives: An Empirical Analysis” 
and aims to bring hypotheses of the previous model to cross-sectional data from the Mannheim 
Innovation Panel dataset. 
The chapter provides some tests of basic elements of the endogenous sunk cost theory in the 
presence of spillovers, in particular that these should affect the escalation of R&D expenditures as 
markets get larger. The exercise is thus not to be seen as a test of Sutton’s overall theory of 
concentration levels in the presence of spillovers. The hypothesis is rather that spillovers have a dis-
incentivizing effect on individual firms R&D decision.  
The most important challenge of empirical studies of this kind is probably to find good proxies for 
knowledge spillovers as these may be, to a large extent, endogenous. Previous empirical papers 
remain inconclusive about the relationship between R&D and knowledge spillovers. As argued by 
Cohen and Walsch (2000) this should not be surprising however, given that such spillovers may be 
both complements as well as substitutes for own R&D. 
The first testable hypothesis is then given on p.49 based on the equations underlying Proposition 1. It 
is thus based on free entry (zero profit) and discrete stages of the underlying game where firms take 
spillovers as exogenous. The presence of such spillovers may then lower the lower bound to 
concentration or even dispose with it.  
As an empirical consequences (Testable hypothesis 1) it is argued that when spillovers are large an 
increase in market size leads to an increase in the number of firms and to market fragmentation.  
It should be emphasized that this hypothesis is different from Sutton’s original empirical strategy 
where these relations are couched in terms of bounds. Because the simple underlying stage game 
neglects many real world features, in larger market a larger set of concentration indices is argued to 
be possible in equilibrium. Immediate empirical predictions of the model only result in the 
counterfactual cases, i.e. what configurations cannot constitute equilibria. Thus neither a fall of 
concentration in particular markets for type I nor for type II markets would be predicted. The 
differences of the current approach to the original bounds paradigm should be made more explicit. 
Only late on p.60 some issues are addressed.  
Table 2.1 presents results that are consistent with the predictions about the concentration ratios for 
exogenous (type I, with low R&D intensity) and endogenous (type II) sunk costs markets (with a funny 
outlier at the 17% level). 
Aside: p.61 I would write “This fact seems to contradict…” as a possible solution (low S) for this 
finding is given just on the following page. 
Table 2.6 (may be moved into the main text) gives regression results allowing for a differentiation of 
low and high spillovers for each market type. It finds market size to be significant for fragmentation 
only in the type I markets but insignificant for type II markets which again is consistent with Testable 
hypothesis 1.  
 
 
Again it should be made clearer how this approach differs from the more modest bounds paradigm. 
It would also be interesting to construct scatter diagrams as in Sutton (1991, p.118) for the different 
spillover sets if the descriptive data allows for this. 
As Testable hypothesis 2 (a corollary of 1) it is argued that from the optimality condition for 
investment in quality (equation (1.7)) one should expect that expenditures in R&D and advertising 
should decline in (ex-post) spillovers and increase in market size. 
As argued in Behringer (2014) one may expect a qualitative difference and the possibility to prevent 
spillovers when looking at R&D versus advertising however. Also significant identification problems 
remain in this context (see the discussion on p.50, e.g. of Acemoglu & Linn (2004)). 
The source of Testable hypothesis 3 in the model is not explicit but seems straightforward. If there is 
a need for protective measures, i.e. the industry is such that there is potential for large (ex-ante) 
spillovers then one should see investment in protective measures. 
Aside: Regarding the critical choice for measures of the counterfactual ex-ante and ex-post spillovers, 
p.54 claims that within the data there are “lots of variables that can be used as some measures of 
knowledge spillovers” but I do not understand those given as info(x) in Table 2.12. Sources 
…“important” for what? Also this chapter is weakest in terms of readability and could be improved 
substantially by some native proofreading. 
 
 
Chapter 3 is entitled “Delegation and Performance”. 
After reading the chapter I found the title a little misleading. The chapter consists of an empirical 
investigation of banking industry. As noted in the introduction, despite being couched within the 
literature on delegation and authority its focus is rather tangential. 
The aim of the investigation is to study “how the level of authority delegation affects organizational 
performance” and it demonstrates that “more authority delegated to the local branch might increase 
the importance of relationship banking”. (p.87). The use of the word “might” may be surprising, but 
this careful formulation turns out to be necessary. 
After a review of the empirical studies of decision making in the banking industry it is found (p.91) 
that: “it would be interesting to measure whether different levels of delegation would result in 
differences in performance”.  
I fully agree but would find the closely related question for bank loans even more interesting: “(how) 
do different mixes of soft- and hard-information used in loan decisions affect the performance of 
such loans?” Inasmuch as a more decentralized organization structure directly implies that more soft 
information is used in loan decisions the two questions are clearly isomorphic.  
The dataset is novel and looks promising. The data on “the level of lending authority delegated to 
regional branches” turns out to be captured in a “Limits” variable, i.e. the highest loan size for which 
the branch can make an independent decision. This is indeed a measure of “delegation” even if quite 
specific to the banking loan industry. 
The major problem with this interesting variable from the side of the econometrician is that it is 
endogenous. Hence good instruments have to be found. The author chooses “distance” (the distance 
of a regional branch from its headquarter) and “duration” (the number of month that a bank was 
present in the region) as instruments in order to use an IV regression to correct for the endogeneity. 
Data on loan performance, both quantitative and qualitative is available.  
The empirical results cast some doubt on whether the instruments (particularly “distance”) are able 
to overcome the identification problems. The IV estimations often produce insignificant coefficients 
and so the conclusions have to remain very modest in particular with the effect of “Limits” on the 
qualitative performance of loans.  
This is unfortunate as it clearly precludes a simple answer about the (optimal) soft-hard information 
mix (or the role of relationship banking) for loan performance too but maybe the former allows for 
alternative instruments.   
 
The thesis meets the necessary standards for a PhD in economics at Charles University and hence I 
recommend the dissertation for defence as my comments have been adequately considered. 
 
Frankfurt am Main, 26.01.2015 
 
 
Stefan Behringer 
